The Challenges of Deterrence in Different Regimes
Part two of a series of articles on deterrence and geopolitical power games
This article looks at the question whether deterrence operates the same way in democratic regimes, authoritarian regimes structured around institutional setting, or regimes subject to one-man rule, such as Putin's Russia. Deterrence theory traditionally assumes that states will act rationally to avoid costs, especially when those costs threaten the state's survival or the regime's stability. However, the type of regime significantly influences how deterrence is perceived and how it must be applied.
The Risk Profile of Different Regimes
In democratic regimes, decision-making tends to be more collective, with various checks and balances that moderate the actions of the state. Leaders in democracies are accountable to their electorate, the media, and other institutional forces, which generally leads to more cautious and calculated decision-making. Deterrence in democratic contexts tends to be more predictable, as the costs of war—human, economic, and political—are heavily scrutinised.
In contrast, authoritarian regimes, while less accountable to public opinion, often operate within a framework of institutional structures, such as a ruling party or a military elite, that can provide a moderating influence on the leader's decisions. The old Soviet Union, for example, had a Politburo that, while not democratic, was a collective leadership structure that could limit the actions of a single leader. Similarly, today's China, though authoritarian, has an institutionalised leadership that balances power within the Communist Party, potentially leading to more cautious decision-making when faced with deterrence.
However, regimes under one-man rule, such as Putin's Russia, present a different and more complex challenge. In such systems, where power is highly concentrated in the hands of a single leader, the risk profile increases significantly. A lone dictator could well take risks that would be considered unacceptable in a more institutionalised regime. The lack of internal checks on power, coupled with the leader's personal ambitions or ideological motivations, can lead to decisions that defy rational calculations as understood in traditional deterrence theory.
The Need for Enhanced Deterrence in One-Man Regimes
Given the potential for higher risk propensity of one-man regimes, it is plausible that they require a higher level of deterrence compared to more institutionalised authoritarian systems like China. This has significant implications for how the West, and the international community at large, should approach deterrence with such regimes. The case of Taiwan, for instance, demonstrates the importance of understanding the different risk tolerances of various regimes. On the basis of the above considerations, China might be more cautious in the face of credible deterrence than Putin was with the invasion of Ukraine.
Historical precedents also offer valuable insights into the dangers posed by one-man rule. Hitler's Germany is a stark example of how a dictator, driven by personal ideology and unbounded by institutional constraints, can make reckless decisions that defy the expectations of more calculated state actors. Hitler’s willingness to gamble on war, even when it seemed irrational to many, underscores the potential for one-man rulers to bypass the usual cost-benefit analyses that guide other types of regimes.
The Importance of Context in Deterrence
While I am generally cautious about drawing direct lessons from history—because history is not an objective set of facts but rather a collection of interpreted events—the case of Hitler does highlight the unique dangers of one-man rule in powerful states. In such scenarios, deterrence must be tailored not just to the state's capabilities but also to the psychological profile of its leader.
This is particularly relevant when considering today’s middle powers or superpowers, whether China, India, Turkey, or Iran. Should any of these countries fall under the sort of one-man rule the Russia has, the international community would be well advised to be particularly vigilant and prepared to apply a level of deterrence that matches the potential risk-taking behaviour of the leader. The stakes are higher, and the consequences of miscalculation could be far-reaching, affecting not just the region but the global order.
Conclusion
The effectiveness of deterrence varies significantly depending on the type of regime it is applied to. In democratic and institutionally robust authoritarian regimes, traditional deterrence methods may suffice, as these states are likely to act in a rational and calculated manner. However, in one-man regimes like Putin's Russia, where decision-making is concentrated in the hands of a single individual, the risk of reckless behaviour is much higher. This necessitates a more robust and nuanced approach to deterrence. The international community must recognize these differences and adjust its strategies accordingly, especially when dealing with powerful or strategically important states under one-man rule.
Brussels, 9 September 2024
Up until 2014, Ukraine had been a puppet state for Russia. Both Russia and Ukraine may have seemed capitalistic, both were heavily handicapped by mafia-style oligarchies. Those in charge of profit centers acted as skimming caretakers rather than as advocates. One leads to thriving commerce while the other causes discontent and inefficiency. On the Russian side, this corruption led to a military hollowed out by stolen supplies, minimal innovation, and poorly maintained equipment.
ReplyDeletePutin seems to have had no training in waging war and had a treaty promising not to invade Ukraine (in exchange for dismantling the ICBMs). Prior to 2014, Putin had arranged to relocate numerous Russian civilians to go and settle in Crimea, so taking and holding it would have been very difficult to prevent. The takeover was accomplished without conflict.
Perhaps Putin assumed that Ukraine would fall the same way, given the number of ethnic Russians present. Putin also may have counted on Trump staying in office in 2020, and had no inkling that Covid and Trump's failures would cause the electorate to remove him. Thus, the invasion of Ukraine had been planned for years, but this planning didn't account for the regime change in the US.
When Putin followed through with his plans, the resistance by Ukraine and the Biden administration was unexpected. Also, his military had accumulated numerous weaknesses that were successfully exploited. Putin's targeting of civilian populations drew outrage and the international community rallied to Ukraine's cause. Indeed, Putin likely had no expectation that the Baltic states would seek Nato protection as a result.
Yes, the West needs to be stronger in its opposition to dictatorships. Part of that opposition needs to include resisting and preventing the sort of Russian influence peddling that has almost free rein in the US. Much or most of the GOP has been compromised by Russia, and it remains very unclear how deep that treason goes within the various military-industrial entities. Musk's fence-sitting provides a cautionary example.
It is entirely unclear why and how the US defense posture weakened relative to Russia. The US fully understood the GRU's attack on the 2016 election, yet did nothing to educate the population as to the precedents and the incompetent response by the FBI/DOJ/CIA etc. Indeed, Trump was allowed to disparage and whitewash the 2016 attack. The integrity of the US remains very much in doubt as this fifth column continues to operate with almost no political recognition nor opposition. This posture remains as dangerous and ugly as it gets. Keeping the public in the dark on this is, at least, endangers US 'democracy' at least as much as Trump's stated goals.