The Russian-Ukraine Conflict as a Failure of Deterrence

 Abstract: This article analyses the potential factors contributing to the start of the Ukraine conflict, by applying the teachings of eminent international affairs scholar John Mearsheimer. It argues that Europe and America failed to send adequate deterrence signals, which played a crucial role in the escalation. While Mearsheimer's analysis that the West helped trigger the conflict is largely correct, it is not for the reasons he has provided.

The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine has been analysed through various lenses, with deterrence theory offering a particularly insightful perspective. John Mearsheimer, a prominent scholar in international relations, has extensively explored the concept of deterrence, emphasising the critical importance of sending clear signals to potential aggressors. The essence of deterrence, according to Mearsheimer, lies in demonstrating sufficient military capability and resolve to convince a rival that any act of aggression would be too costly to pursue.

When we apply Mearsheimer's theory to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, several key miscalculations become apparent—miscalculations that ultimately contributed to the tragic conflict we witness today. The question that arises is: What led Vladimir Putin to believe that he could invade Ukraine with minimal repercussions from the West?

Miscalculations and Bad Signalling

From the Russian perspective, Putin's most significant miscalculation was underestimating Ukraine's ability to defend itself and the West’s willingness to support it. Historians will later uncover the dynamics of what happened in the run-up to the invasion, but based on available information, it appears that Putin believed the West would respond to the invasion of Ukraine in a manner similar to its mild reaction to the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the Donbass region. In those instances, the West's response was characterised by limited sanctions and diplomatic protests. These actions, while significant, were likely interpreted by Putin as a sign that Western Europe and the United States lacked the resolve to stand firmly against Russia's actions.

If this analysis is accurate, one could argue that the West's failure to send clear and strong signals of deterrence to Russia played a pivotal role in bringing about the current situation. While the United States had long warned European nations, particularly Germany, about the dangers of becoming overly reliant on Russian energy imports, these warnings were not heeded. Germany's decision to make Russian gas a cornerstone of its energy strategy created a perception among Russia's leadership that Europe was economically so entangled with Russia that it could not easily take a hard stance against Russian aggression.

On the one hand, the West was voicing noble sentiments in defence of democracy and freedom, while on the other hand, it was doing business with Russian oligarchs and state companies. This disconnect between Western rhetoric and actions created a dangerous ambiguity in the signals sent to Russia. Deterrence relies on clarity, and in this case, the West's signals were anything but clear.

What Mearsheimer Got Wrong

While Mearsheimer’s theory of deterrence can help guide us through what went wrong in the Russo-Ukrainian war, his most recent stance on the conflict remains quite problematic and fundamentally unhelpful for understanding the situation. In recent years, Mearsheimer has argued that the West, particularly NATO, bears the main responsibility for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. His argument is that NATO's expansion eastward was a direct provocation that cornered Russia, leaving it with little choice but to respond aggressively. This line of reasoning, however, is contentious and deserves closer examination.

Mearsheimer's argument hinges on the assumption that Russia is somewhat equivalent to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. He treats it as a superpower with legitimate claims to a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. There are at least two reasons why his analysis is arguably off the mark.

1. Russia is Not the Soviet Union

Following the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia is no longer a global superpower on par with the United States. It is a diminished entity, one that lost the Cold War, while the West emerged victorious. This defeat is underscored by the fact that Russia has embraced capitalism—the ideology of its former foe. This economic and ideological capitulation has left Russia without a chance of recovering its former status. After the Soviet Union's demise, the mantle of an alternative leader of the world passed to China. While Russia still possesses nuclear weapons, so do China, India, Pakistan, and Israel.

Because of Russia's diminished power, the expansion of NATO cannot be seen as a provocation but as a natural consequence of the Soviet Union's collapse and the subsequent realignment of Eastern European nations towards mainstream Europe.

The binary view of the world as divided between two superpowers—each with its own sphere of influence—no longer applies. To understand the dynamics at play, it is essential to view the situation through a post-Cold War lens rather than through the outdated framework of Cold War-era geopolitics.

2. Putin is Not Russia

The Soviet Union was a communist regime, run by the Communist Party, with a Politburo that held elections and chose its leadership. This was an institutional process - not a democracy by any means, but a system that ensured continuity and accountability among its leaders. Russia today is a different entity. Vladimir Putin has hijacked the democratic system put in place after the fall of the Soviet regime. He is the supreme leader, accountable to nobody.

It is thus legitimate to argue that Putin’s personal opinions and orientations determine the course of Russia’s conduct in the war. For external observers, there are no leading opinion makers, key policymakers, financial supporters, or lobby groups that can help them understand what Putin’s next move will be. Putin’s own statements in support of the war range from claiming a desire to reestablish the glories of the past Russian Empire, to geostrategic arguments, to wanting to establish an alternative order to the West-dominated post-WW2 world governance.

Conclusion: Mearsheimer’s Realism Does Not Apply, but his Deterrence Concept does

According to Mearsheimer, NATO's expansion eastward was a direct provocation that cornered Russia, leaving it with little choice but to respond aggressively. This line of reasoning, however, is contentious and deserves a closer examination. 

Because Russia is not the Soviet Union and because Putin is not Russia, Mearsheimer is wrong in applying his “realism” theorem to the Ukrainian war. Mearsheimer’s theory rests on the assumption the international system is substantially anarchic and states are rational actors that think above all about how they can survive in this state of international anarchy.

But because Russia is not the Soviet Union and because Putin is not Russia, Mearsheimer is wrong in applying his “realism” theorem to the Ukrainian war. While realism assumes that states act rationally in their self-interest, the concept of what constitutes "self-interest" can be distorted in a dictatorship where the leader’s personal goals or psychological state take precedence over national interest. Under Putin, Russia cannot be considered a rational actor any more than Hitler´s Germany could be considered one

To be able to blame the west, Mearsheimer would have done better to point out how his deterrence theory can be used to better understand the dynamics of what happened during the years preceding the invasion in February 2022 - including the West's failures - and help chart a path toward a future peace.

Appendix: Russia, the Soviet Union, and Ukrainian Nationhood

I want to conclude by adding a short historical note to better place the Ukraine conflict in its proper context. 

The breakup of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of 15 independent states, with Russia being the largest and most powerful among them. The relationship between Russia and the other former Soviet countries has long been fraught. Under the Tsar, Russia acted as the imperial power overseeing its many diverse territories and peoples. In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union’s creation in December 1922 was preceded by lengthy debates over how the new Union would be structured.

The Soviet Congress of January 1918 established the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), triggering a similar trend in other parts of the former empire, so that by late 1922, twenty-one autonomous republics and regions had been established within the RSFSR itself, and the revolutionary government was collaborating with Soviet republics in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Georgia, and Ukraine to form what in December 1922 would become the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). It is interesting to note that in the discussions leading up to that fateful moment, Stalin's initial draft of a Central Committee resolution had called for the “entry” of these other republics into the Russian federation. Such wording was significant, given that Stalin himself was a Georgian national. Lenin, in a September 1922 letter, opposed such an approach. “We consider ourselves [i.e., the Russian Soviet Republic], the Ukrainian SSR, and others to be equal, and we should enter with them on an equal basis into a new union, a new federation, the Union of the Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia.”

Thus, the USSR was created as a union of SSRs, all nominally equal. In practice, though, Russia’s overwhelming size, geographical location, and historical dominance put it at the centre of the new state, whose two main cities remained Moscow and St. Petersburg (renamed Leningrad during the Soviet era).

Given this background, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1990 and the creation of 15 independent states provided a dramatic change: Russia lost its uncontested dominance over the newly independent nations that had once made up the periphery of the Soviet Union. This must have proven traumatic for many Russians, including Vladimir Putin. Many of the new countries soon began to assert their own national identities. This became particularly evident in the three Baltic Republics, Georgia, and Ukraine. The Baltic Republics, which had been the last to be incorporated into the USSR in 1940, were the first to break away by joining the EU in 2004. In Georgia and Ukraine, tense political struggles between supporters and opponents of closer ties with Europe emerged in the early years of this century, a process that is still unfolding as we write this.

Santa Monica, 26 August 2024