The Challenges of Deterrence in Different Regimes
Part two of a series of articles on deterrence and geopolitical power games This article looks at the question whether deterrence operates the same way in democratic regimes, authoritarian regimes structured around institutional setting, or regimes subject to one-man rule, such as Putin's Russia. Deterrence theory traditionally assumes that states will act rationally to avoid costs, especially when those costs threaten the state's survival or the regime's stability. However, the type of regime significantly influences how deterrence is perceived and how it must be applied. The Risk Profile of Different Regimes In democratic regimes, decision-making tends to be more collective, with various checks and balances that moderate the actions of the state. Leaders in democracies are accountable to their electorate, the media, and other institutional forces, which generally leads to more cautious and calculated decision-making. Deterrence in democratic contexts tends to be more pred